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Essay

Prosecuting Inequitable Conduct
Kyle R. Kroll †
In 2004, South Korean researcher Hwang Woo-suk made
scientific headlines; he published a groundbreaking paper in Science, one of the premier scientific journals, detailing his creation
of the world’s first cloned human embryos and stem cells.1 Later
that year, he published another paper in Science claiming that
he had created “human embryonic stem cells genetically
matched to specific patients.” 2 He even filed for a U.S. patent on
the method for creating stem cell lines. 3 Many leading scientists
considered this advancement the next step in the development
of cures for diseases such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, and cancer. 4 Despite the auspicious nature of Woo-suk’s discovery,
though, some were not convinced. The doubters suspected that
Woo-suk’s success was too rapid, and they began wading through
Woo-suk’s published data. They found significant evidence of
fabrication. 5 By 2006, Woo-suk was discredited and stripped of

† Kyle R. Kroll is an attorney practicing in the areas of antitrust, unfair
competition, and intellectual property litigation. He is a 2016 graduate of the
University of Minnesota Law School and a former editor for Minnesota Law Review. Special thanks to Andrew Mohring and to friends, peers, and colleagues
who provided helpful feedback and advice. The views, thoughts, and opinions
expressed in this article belong solely to the author, and are not those of the
author ’s employer, organization, committee, or other group or individual. Copyright © 2018 by Kyle R. Kroll.
1. Choe Sang-Hun, Disgraced Cloning Expert Convicted in South Korea,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/world/asia/
27clone.html.
2. Id.
3. See U.S. Patent No. 8,647,872 (provisionally filed Dec. 30, 2004), http://
patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=
PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=
8647872.PN.&OS=PN/8647872&RS=PN/8647872.
4. See Sang-Hun, supra note 1.
5. Id.
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his license to research in South Korea—his name no longer emblematic of innovation, but instead fraud and deceit. 6
In the aftermath of Woo-suk’s downfall, his patent application remained. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) granted the patent in 2012. 7 Those who remembered
Woo-suk’s fraud were surprised, lamenting that the USPTO
should not have granted the patent because Woo-suk’s appliedfor stem cell line and method for creating it was “the subject of
his fraud.” 8 Regardless of this criticism, the patent has not been
invalidated.9
Woo-suk’s story is not unique,10 but his fraud is especially
egregious. Each year, courts find that applicants have defrauded
the USTPO in a variety of ways—though, such findings are uncommon. 11 Although it is unclear just how prevalent knowing
and willful patent fraud is, as the number of patent applications
each year increases in number, 12 finding ways to deter and curb
such fraud increases in importance. Fraudulent procurement of
patents negatively affects not only true innovation, but also the
American economy.
The USPTO, as the agency tasked with examining patent
applications, is the first line of defense against patent fraud. But
some point to the USPTO’s examination policies as potentially
inviting fraud. By way of background, the USPTO’s patent examiners (those who review applications) are evaluated on a
6. See id.
7. See Andrew Pollack, Disgraced Scientist Granted U.S. Patent for Work
Found to Be Fraudulent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/02/15/science/disgraced-scientist-granted-us-patent-for-work-found-to-be
-fraudulent.html.
8. Matt Levy, USPTO Issues Patent to Fraud, PATENT PROGRESS (Feb. 19,
2014), http://www.patentprogress.org/2014/02/19/uspto-issues-patent-fraud.
9. See U.S. Patent No. 8,647,872 (filed Dec. 9, 2011), http://patft.uspto.gov/
netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=
%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=8647872
.PN.&OS=PN/8647872&RS=PN/8647872.
10. See, e.g., Ann Steffora Mutschler, Aptix Founder Sentenced to 17 Years
for Perjury, Obstruction of Justice, EDN NETWORK (Jan. 9, 2007), https://www
.edn.com/electronics-news/4315541/Aptix-founder-sentenced-to-17-years-for
-perjury-obstruction-of-justice.
11. See, e.g., Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2017); TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295,
1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2016); TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 16 F.
Supp. 3d 385, 398 (D. N.J. 2014).
12. See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963–2015, USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last updated
June 15, 2016).
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quota system, which encourages them to examine as many applications as possible. 13 Some commentators have questioned
whether this policy has turned the USPTO into a rubber-stamp
institution. 14 In the meantime, the number of patent applications and grants since 2000 has almost tripled.15 This has led to
an even greater need for the USPTO to quickly accept or reject
patents so as not to fall behind. 16 The cycle is further incentivized by the increasing economic and financial value of patents.17
And it is also enabled by the difficulty, high cost, and/or impossibility of investigating every representation made by patent applicants. The USPTO simply does not have the wherewithal to
investigate every claim of inventorship, utility, novelty, and
other issues related to patentability. Thus, along with the important interests at stake, the complexities of patent law, and
the USPTO’s current weaknesses combine to create a situation
in which fraud is less likely to be identified and thwarted.
As demonstrated in this exposition, it is not surprising that
patents are procured by fraud. But recognition of this problem
does nothing to solve it because, increasingly, the value of a patent is not in its ingenuity, but instead its threat-value. Simply
threatening patent infringement, regardless of the patent’s validity, frequently leads to settlement due to the extremely high
cost to litigate infringement suits. 18 This has led to the onset of
the often-criticized “patent trolls” and other entities, whose primary purpose is to monetize patents and so by enforcing existing

13. See Gene Quinn, Suggestions for Fixing the US Patent System, IPWATCHDOG (July 30, 2009), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/07/30/
suggestions-for-fixing-the-us-patent-system/id=4725.
14. See, e.g., Daniel Nazer, Magical Drug Wins EFF ’s Stupid Patent of the
Month, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2014/08/magical-drug-wins-effs-stupid-patent-month.
15. See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, supra note 12.
16. See generally Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a
Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 676 (2015) (“Our results suggest that
the inability of the PTO to finally rid itself of an application biases it toward
granting patents.”).
17. See K.N.C., Valuing Patents: Doing the Maths, ECONOMIST (Aug. 17,
2011), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/08/valuing-patents.
18. See Gene Quinn, Extortion Patent Style: Small Business in the Troll
Crosshairs, IPWATCHDOG (May 24, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/05/
24/extortion-patent-style-small-business-in-the-troll-crosshairs/id=17425; see
also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 9 (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_
report.pdf (listing average infringement litigation costs).
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patent rights through suits and threats to sue. 19 Threat monetization is common and often costly to defendants. 20
Most patent law scholars argue that the patent system’s
problems can be addressed by reforms to USPTO rules, remedies
and attorney’s fees, and the entire patent system.21 But scholars
have not considered whether criminal law can or should be used
to address fraudulent application behavior. Since 2013, however,
27 states have made it a crime to assert patent infringement in
bad faith, indicating that there is a general impression that patent abuses have increased in number and warrant criminal
punishment.22
This Essay asks whether applicants who commit fraud when
applying for a patent—called “inequitable conduct”—can or
should be prosecuted (in the criminal sense) under federal criminal law, in line with growing state-law trends toward criminalizing harmful patent-related behavior. Part I provides a background on patents, inequitable conduct, and the doctrines courts
have employed to address such fraud. Part II analyzes whether
a patent applicant who commits inequitable conduct could be
held criminally responsible under existing federal criminal statutes. Finally, Part III concludes by asking whether inequitable
should be prosecuted, even if existing federal crimes are applicable. Although extending federal criminal law to patent abuses
may appear harsh, it would be justified in cases involving flagrant and willful fraud.

19. See generally Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013).
20. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 18, at 9–10.
21. E.g., Tom Ewing, Practical Considerations in the Indirect Deployment
of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI.
& TECH. L.J. 109, 123 (2012).
22. Eileen Hyde, State and Federal Attempts to Combat Bad Faith Assertion of Patents, BAKER BOTTS (Apr., 2016), http://www.bakerbotts.com/ideas/
publications/2016/04/ip-report-e-hyde.

2018]

PROSECUTING INEQUITABLE BEHAVIOR

53

I. BACKGROUND ON PATENTS, INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT, AND FRAUD ON THE USPTO
A. PATENT BASICS
Patents may be granted for any “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 23 However, in order to be patentable, the invention must also be novel, non-obvious, and useful. 24 Generally
speaking, this requires that an invention be new and creative,
involve more ingenuity and skill than held by an average person,
and have a specific, realizable, and substantial benefit. 25 Every
patent application must also accurately list the person(s) who
invented the claimed concept.26
In addition to patentability requirements, there are multiple bars to patentability. For example, the “on-sale bar” precludes a patent grant if there was a definite sale or offer to sell
the invention more than one year before the effective filing date
of an application, and the subject matter of the sale or offer to
sell fully anticipates the claimed invention or would render the
claimed invention obvious. 27 The same is true if the invention
was in “public use” or publicly available more than one year prior
to the effective filing date. 28 These bars, along with the other
technical requirements for applying for patent, not only make it
more difficult to obtain a patent, but also render patent applications more complex, leaving more room for error—as well as chicanery. Whether an idea is unpatentable because of these bars
or failure to meet other requirements sometimes depends on the
existence of non-public facts, to which patent examiners often do
not have access unless the facts are disclosed by applicants.
A patent’s power is, quite simply, the right to exclude all
others from “making, using, or selling in the United States the
invention claimed by the patent for twenty years.” 29 Most scholars agree that this statutory grant of monopoly power benefits
23. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
24. See id. at § 101–103.
25. See, e.g., Guidelines for Examination of Applications for Compliance
with the Utility Requirement, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/
mpep/s2107.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
26. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 115(a), 116(a).
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
28. See id.
29. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 2 (2003).
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society at large because it incentivizes and facilitates innovation.30 The principal way in which the patent grant does this is
by trading market-wide exclusivity for the public disclosure of
new and useful ideas. Patents thus enable inventors to recoup
costs and potentially make a profit, while enabling other inventors to learn from new discoveries. This, in turn, facilitates licensing and reduces duplicative research and development. 31
First to file rights and the monopoly grant also encourage competition between inventors to innovate quickly.32 Scholars, economists, and legislators frequently credit these trade-offs as a reason for the United States’ technological dominance.
Patent rights are primarily enforced through litigation, 33
and in the past decade, the number of patent infringement suits
has increased dramatically. 34 There are a variety of reasons for
this increase, one of which is product complexity. Advanced
gadgets rely on thousands of patents at once.35 It is therefore
easy for a high-tech product to infringe on at least one patent,
perhaps inadvertently. This is especially the case because a
product need only practice one of the many “claims” in a patent
for there to be actionable infringement. 36 Companies are also
constantly deriving new inventions from past ideas, leading to
sometimes-overlapping patent rights and increasing the likelihood of infringement. This likelihood also increases with the issuance of sometimes weak or invalid patents. 37
30. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, JEFFERSON VS. THE PATENT TROLLS:
A POPULIST VISION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1–2 (2008).
31. Id.
32. E.g., William Wynne, Patent Wars, Trolls, and Privateers: Killing Innovation, Death by 1,000 Lawsuits, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1009, 1014 (2013).
33. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1)–(2), 271 (2012).
34. See Amy G. O’Toole, Recent Governmental Initiatives and Findings Addressing NPE Litigation—Are There Any Judicial Solutions?, in NON-PRACTICING ENTITY PATENT LITIGATION 2013: PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE PERSPECTIVES
67 (R. David Donoghue ed., 2013).
35. Wynne, supra note 33, at 1017–18. Commentators estimate that royalties paid by smartphone manufacturers may exceed $120 for every device. See
Thibault Schrepel, Patent Privateering—Patents as Weapons, CTR. FOR POL’Y
STUDIES (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.cps.org.uk/blog/q/date/2014/10/28/
patent-privateering-patents-as-weapons.
36. E.g., Bayer AG v. Elan Pharma. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1247
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
37. See generally Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 16; Douglas R. Nemec
& Scott M. Flanz, After Period of High Invalidation Rates, New US Patent Challenge Procedures May Slow Down to Moderate Pace, SKADDEN (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/after-period-high-invalidation-rates-new
-us-patent-challenge-procedures-may-slow-down-moder.
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Some competitors also use patent litigation as a competitive
tactic. 38 This form of litigation is most common in industries
built primarily on intellectual property (e.g., high-tech industries), where the innovation is incremental and patented ideas
are more likely to be interchangeable. 39 Strategic patent litigation and threats thereof tend to generate substantial cash for patent holders, thereby increasing the demand for, and overall
value of, patents.40 Thus, when competitors use invalid patents
against rivals, they “undermine both the patent system and the
competitive marketplace. They raise entry costs and delay market entry, deter customers and business partners from contracting with new entrants, cause consumers to pay artificially inflated prices, and hurt innovation. This is true even when other
firms know or suspect the patent of being invalid.” 41
B. APPLYING FOR A PATENT
The patent application process entails, among other things,
determining what kind of application to file, preparing an application, filing the application over the internet or through the
mail, and examination by the USPTO. 42
Although there are several different kinds of patents and
applications, the typical, “non-provisional” application generally
includes an abstract, a specification, a description, patent
claims, drawings, and an oath of inventorship. 43 The abstract

38. See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives
and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571,
1587–88 (2009); Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 512 (2003); Charles
Duan, Big Businesses Are Filing Frivolous Patent Lawsuits To Stifle Innovative
Small Competitors, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
realspin/2014/02/24/big-businesses-are-filing-frivolous-patent-lawsuits-to
-stifle-innovative-small-competitors.
39. See Chien, supra note 38, at 1589.
40. See, e.g., Patent Litigation: Litigating Against a Non-Practicing Entity,
Practical Law Practice Note 5-553-7946 [hereinafter “Patent Litigation Practice
Note”].
41. Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust, Inequitable Conduct, and the Intent to
Deceive the Patent Office, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 323, 325 (2011).
42. See Patent Process Overview, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patentsgetting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/utility-patent/patent
-process-0 (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
43. See Nonprovisional (Utility) Patent Application Filing Guide, USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent
-applications/nonprovisional-utility-patent#heading-4 (last visited Apr. 2,
2018).

56

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES

[102:49

provides a brief description of the invention. 44 The specification
(and description) provides information that is needed to enable
individuals skilled in the art or science (to which the claimed invention pertains) to make and use the invention. 45 The description distinguishes the new invention from past developments. 46
The claims set forth the scope of a patent’s protection using specific language and terms. 47 Drawings necessary to understand
the subject matter being patented are required and must show
every feature of the claimed invention.48 Finally, the oath of inventorship is a formal statement made under oath that the
claimed inventors are the sole or joint inventor(s). 49
If the USPTO denies an application, applicants may request
reconsideration and conduct administrative appeals.50 The process of practicing before the USPTO while applying for a patent
is referred to as “prosecution.” 51 Once granted, the patent relates
back to the effective filing date. 52
After the USPTO issues a patent, patent assignees (owners)
have the exclusive right to prevent others from practicing the
invention claimed in the patent. They may send demand letters
and file lawsuits to enforce this right. In response, accused infringers may defend themselves in court or file a request for reexamination or inter partes review with the USPTO. 53 The
USPTO’s administrative procedures allow defendants to challenge the validity of a patent (based on patentability requirements). Either kind of challenge (whether through litigation or
administrative proceedings) can be prohibitively expensive. 54
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The irony in relation to this Essay’s topic is not lost on the author.
52. The effective filing date is, generally speaking, the filing date of the patent application claiming the invention or the filing date of an earlier priority
application to which a patent or application is entitled to a right of priority. See
35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119, 120; Amanda K. Murphy, Effective Filing Date: What is
That Again?, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail
.aspx?g=3f811784-1fb2-48b2-a228-0c87c3e230ca.
53. Gene Quinn, What To Do If You Are Sued For Patent Infringement, IPWATCHDOG (June 11, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/06/02/what
-to-do-sued-for-patent-infringement/id=17538/.
54. In addition to the hundreds of thousands of dollars it may cost to defend
a suit, see EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 20, at 9, the mere fee to
request review by the USPTO can exceed $10,000. See USPTO Fee Schedule,
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C. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND FRAUD ON THE PATENT OFFICE
Patent attorneys must be licensed by the patent bar in order
to assist inventors with any work before the USPTO. 55 These attorneys are held to the USPTO’s Rules of Professional Conduct,
which largely mirror the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.56 In particular, ABA Rule 3.3 and USPTO Rule 11.303, regarding candor toward a tribunal, requires that the lawyer “not
knowingly . . . make any false statements of fact or law or fail to
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made
to the tribunal by the [lawyer].” The lawyer must also not “[o]ffer
evidence that the [lawyer] knows to be false.”57
The above ethical provisions supplement the affirmative
duty, within USPTO Rule 56, to disclose information that is material to patentability at the time an application is made and
during examination.58 Importantly, this duty applies not only to
patent attorneys, but also inventors and any other “person who
is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the
application.” 59 It makes intuitive sense to impose this duty on
patent applicants and the agents and attorneys who assist them
because such individuals, not USPTO examiners, are most likely
to know of any relevant prior art.
Material information may relate to any of the patentability
requirements or bars. For example, material information frequently includes “prior art,” which is any information showing
the state of invention in a given field (potentially non-invalidating prior art) or showing that the invention is already available
to the public, has been sold, or has already been patented, anywhere in the world (potentially invalidating prior art). 60 Invalidating prior art may show that the applied-for invention lacks
novelty, one of the elements of patentability. 61 It could also disclose the applicability of certain bars to patentability.
USPTO (Apr. 9, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and
-payment/uspto-fee-schedule.
55. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.5–9 (2008).
56. See USPTO, ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT VS.
USPTO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2013), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/
boards/oed/AbavsUSPTO.pdf (comparing both rules by incorporating changes
within 78 Fed. Reg. 20179 (2013)).
57. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.303 (2013).
58. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012).
59. Id. § 1.56(c).
60. See generally Gene Quinn, What is Prior Art?, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 2,
2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/10/02/what-is-prior-art/id=12677.
61. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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Intentional and knowing failure to comply with the duty of
disclosure is referred to as “inequitable conduct” or “fraud on the
patent office” because it results in the issuance of an invalid patent procured by false statements or material omissions. 62 The
doctrine of inequitable conduct is technically an affirmative defense to patent infringement. If a patent applicant committed inequitable conduct, either through an intentional misrepresentation or violation of the duty of disclosure, with respect to any of
a patent’s claims, all of the claims are invalid. 63 This harsh penalty is rooted in equitable principles—such as the doctrine of unclean hands—and is justifiable in view of the important public
interests at stake. 64 “The far reaching social and economic consequences of a patent . . . give the public a paramount interest in
seeing that patent monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate scope.” 65
Due to the strength and breadth of the inequitable conduct
defense, defendants are required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the patent holder had specific intent to deceive through misrepresentations or omissions, and (2) the information that was the subject of the deception was material. 66
Prior to 2011, courts were divided as to whether intent could include negligent conduct and the exact definition of materiality,
sometimes employing a sliding-scale test. But in Therasense, the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the law. 67
Prior to Therasense, there was a strong sense among the patent bar and federal courts that assertions of inequitable conduct
were too widespread. As the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
itself put it, “the habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost

62. E.g., 1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST
LAW § 15:2 (2016); Dennis Crouch, Inequitable Conduct: Federal Circuit Places
Another Nail in the Coffin, PATENTLYO (Sept. 14, 2012), http://patentlyo.com/
patent/2012/09/inequitable-conduct-federal-circuit-places-another-nail-in-the
-coffin.html.
63. See, e.g., Fraud, Inequitable Conduct, or Violation of Duty of Disclosure
Affects All Claims, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2016
.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2018); cf. Allan Bullwinkel, Specifically Fighting Inequitable Conduct, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 349, 354 (2011).
64. Id. at 359.
65. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(citations omitted)).
66. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
67. Id. at 1290.
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every major patent case has become an absolute plague.” 68 Noting that accusations of equitable conduct are only factual “in but
a small percentage of the cases” and therefore “destroy” respect
for the patent bar’s integrity, the Federal Circuit lamented that
unsupported charges are “negative contribution[s] to the rightful
administration of justice.” 69 The Federal Circuit in Therasense
thus sought to curb the popular and “significant litigation strategy” of charging inequitable conduct when there was no known
basis for doing so.70 The Federal Circuit also sought to reduce
the burden the doctrine imposes on courts and on the USPTO
(i.e., due to frequent charges of inequitable conduct, patent prosecutors began to “bury PTO examiners with a deluge of prior art
references,” making examination more difficult).71
With this understanding, the Federal Circuit held that a
gross negligence “should have known” standard is insufficient to
satisfy the intent element of inequitable conduct. 72 Now, in all
cases, there must be a deliberate decision to misrepresent or
withhold information.73 However, specific intent can still be inferred from indirect and circumstantial evidence, so long as intent to deceive is “the single most reasonable inference available
to be drawn from the evidence.” 74
The Therasense court also elevated the materiality standard, requiring a but-for showing; information is material if the
USPTO (through its examiners) would not have allowed the
claim had it been aware of the information. 75 But in cases of affirmative, egregious misrepresentations, the conduct is always
considered material; this exception strikes a “necessary balance
between encouraging honesty before the [USPTO] and preventing unfounded accusations of inequitable conduct.” 76
68. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
69. Id.
70. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288.
71. Id. at 1289.
72. Id. at 1290.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1290–91.
75. Id. at 1291–92.
76. Id. Following Therasense, the USPTO issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to adopt the but-for materiality standard for violations of Rule 56, so as
to “harmonize the materiality standard for the duty of disclosure before the
[USPTO] with the . . . standard . . . for establishing inequitable conduct before
the courts.” Revision of the Duty to Disclose Information in Patent Applications
and Reexamination Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 74987, 74988 (Oct. 28, 2016) (to
be codified in 37 C.F.R. Part 1).

60

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES

[102:49

With these holdings, the Therasense court heightened the
standards for showing inequitable conduct but kept the doctrine’s relatively broad concept of fraud. As compared with common law fraud, for example, the current inequitable conduct concept includes not only intentional misrepresentations, but also
partial- and half-disclosures, as well as intentional omissions. 77
The conduct that may form the basis of an inequitable conduct
defense includes that of perjury, manufacturing of false evidence, suppression of evidence, and deliberate non-disclosure of
information. 78
Because the Federal Circuit establishes controlling precedent with regard to patent cases, Therasense’s holdings are applied nationwide. Commentators are critical of the new standard
for a variety of reasons, such as its disconnect from prior precedent and USPTO guidance and rules. 79 But despite this, no certiorari petition involving inequitable conduct has been granted
by the Supreme Court for over 70 years. 80
II. APPLICATION OF FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME
TO INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
This Part reviews the basic elements of relevant federal
crimes and explores whether inequitable conduct falls within
each crime’s scope. The Part discusses perjury, false statement,
obstruction of justice, and mail and wire fraud—crimes that, by
their nature, would seem to prohibit inequitable conduct.
A. PERJURY
At first glance, it is axiomatic that inequitable conduct,
which involves either material misrepresentations or intentional
omissions, can be the basis for a perjury charge. Despite this,
there appear to be no modern reported cases in which such a

77. See HOLMES, supra note 62; see Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 759 F.2d 10, 14 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[C]onduct before the [USPTO] which
may render a patent unenforceable is broader than the common law tort of
fraud.”).
78. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806 (1945); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944);
Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
79. See Gideon Mark & T. Leigh Anenson, Inequitable Conduct and Walker
Process Claims after Therasense and the America Invents Act, 16 U. PENN. J.
BUS. L. 361, 381–86 (2014).
80. Id. at 391.
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charge has been prosecuted. 81 But in a case from 1913, Patterson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for
perjury when the defendant lied in his patent application that
he was the original inventor. 82 And the last time the Supreme
Court considered the inequitable conduct doctrine, in Precision
Instrument, during the 1945 term, the Court remarked that the
case’s patent history was “steeped in perjury and undisclosed
knowledge of perjury.” 83
In Precision Instrument, the plaintiff knew that another inventor, Larson, had intentionally misrepresented facts to the
USPTO when applying for the patent-in-suit. 84 Instead of revealing this, which would have led to invalidation of the patent, the
plaintiff contracted with Larson to keep the plaintiff’s
knowledge of Larson’s “perjury” secret so long as Larson agreed
to license other patents to the plaintiff, and vice versa.85 When
Larson breached the licensing agreements, the plaintiff brought
suit, but because the plaintiff had contributed to Larson’s perjury, his own patent infringement suit was barred on inequitable
conduct grounds. 86
Although Precision Instrument is not a criminal case, it is
revealing that the Supreme Court considered the false statements in the case tantamount to perjury. The Court noted that
not all cases of inequitable conduct are punishable as perjury—
implying that at least in some cases, the fraud could be so egregious and provident to justify prosecution. 87 Read in light of Patterson’s previous ruling, Precision Instrument did not disturb the
possibility that patent applicants may be convicted for perjury if
they make false statements to the USPTO.
Perjury requires (1) an oath, (2) before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person, (3) a statement that the declarant does not believe to be true and intentionally makes, (4) which is material. 88
81. Individuals have been charged for providing false evidence and statements to a court in a civil case involving patent validity. See, e.g., United States
v. Mohsen, 587 F.3d 1028, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming conviction and
jury instructions).
82. See Patterson v. United States, 202 F. 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1913).
83. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 816.
84. Id. at 809–13.
85. Id. at 813–14.
86. Id. at 816–20.
87. See id. at 815; see also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649
F.3d 1276, 1297–98 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that inequitable conduct must be flexible, as a doctrine that arose under the court’s equity powers).
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (2012); 60A AM. JUR. 2D PERJURY § 10 (2016).
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Perjury also includes any declaration or statement under penalty of perjury (when the statement is signed and accompanied
by language indicating it is made under penalty of perjury), 89
along with previous elements (3) and (4). 90
Elements one and two would appear to be easily met if an
applicant makes a false statement in a patent application and
makes an oath, before a competent person, that certain aspects
of the application are true. 91 This was the basis for the perjury
conviction in Patterson—the defendant had made the oath before
a notary public. Applicants no longer need to make oaths of inventorship before competent persons when submitting their applications, however, and may subscribe to the required application documents in a declaration. 92 To wit, the USPTO’s standard
forms do not reference the perjury statute or the customary “under penalty of perjury” language, but rather the false statements
statute (discussed herein). 93 Thus, perjury may not be viable in
most circumstances.94
But misrepresentations made before the USPTO’s Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (the “PTAB”), a tribunal established by
statute and composed of administrative judges 95 who constitute
officers or persons competent to give an oath under federal law, 96
could support a perjury charge. Proceedings before the PTAB,
however, only occur in cases of reconsideration, reexaminations,
interferences, or inter partes review. 97 These proceedings are
much less frequent than examinations. 98 And, as already noted,
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (2012).
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(2).
91. See Patterson, 202 F. at 210.
92. See 35 U.S.C. § 115; 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.63, 21.68 (2015).
93. See Oaths and Declarations, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/s602.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
94. The crime of false statement, which is related, may be, though. See infra
Part II.B.
95. Id.
96. A competent tribunal, officer, or person is someone authorized to administer oaths. See United States v. Curtis, 107 U.S. 671, 673 (1883). Administrative law judges generally have such authority. See 21 Fed. Proc., L. Ed.
§ 50:239 (2016); see also, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 23; 37 C.F.R. § 351.9(b)(1) (2006); 29
C.F.R. § 1614.109(f )(2) (2012).
97. See About PTAB, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patents-application
-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/resources/about-ptab (last visited Apr.
2, 2018).
98. By way of example, in the Woo-suk case, affidavits were submitted in
support of the patent after it was initially rejected. Pollack, supra note 7. The
affidavits then convinced the USPTO to change its mind. Id.
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application materials are usually submitted for examination
without an accompanying oath before a competent tribunal.99
The ability to prove element three (the statement-intent element) in a case of inequitable conduct will, of course, depend
upon the facts of the case. An outright material misrepresentation is certainly sufficient. 100 But there are complications in
other situations. Culpable statements must pertain to facts, not
opinions or beliefs. 101 Therefore, only statements concerning factual matters can be perjurious, such as statements relating to
the non-existence of prior art, whether persons of ordinary skill
in the art actually believe the invention to require sufficient skill
and ingenuity, the utility of the proffered invention, or the
named inventors—to name a few. This would probably not include an inventor or attorney’s legal arguments as to patentability. Further, literally true, but vague or misleading, statements
are insufficient grounds for perjury.102 This is a significant barrier to prosecuting inequitable conduct as perjury because most
patents involve highly-technical statements, which are likely to
enable literal truth defenses.
Most importantly, an intentional omission cannot qualify as
perjury because, by definition, an omission is an absence of a
statement, which the statute requires. 103 Thus, failure to disclose prior art, for example, would not be punishable under the
perjury statute unless the applicant falsely stated under oath
that no prior art exists. 104 Perjury may result if a person intentionally makes a statement about a fact without knowing
whether the statement is true or false.105 But the USPTO does
99. See 35 U.S.C. § 25 (2012); Oaths and Declarations, USPTO, http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s602.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
100. This was the situation in Precision Instrument. See supra note 83 and
accompanying text.
101. See 60A AM. JUR. 2D PERJURY § 18 (2016).
102. See, e.g., Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 361–62 (1973).
103. See id. at 362 (“[A]ny special problems arising from the literally true
but unresponsive answer are to be remedied through the ‘questioner ’s acuity’
and not by a federal perjury prosecution.”); see also United States v. MartinezMercado, 888 F.2d 1484, 1492 (5th Cir. 1989) (“ The omission of certain facts
from the reports and written statements of the prosecution’s witnesses, alone,
is certainly not adequate to put the prosecution on notice of perjury on their
part, much less to establish that such perjury in fact occurred.”).
104. Cf. THK Am., Inc. v. NSK, Ltd., 917 F. Supp. 563, 570 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(considering, in the context of Fed. R. Evid. 609(b), whether a prior conviction
for filing false corporate income tax statements is sufficiently probative of
whether an applicant committed the “crime” of withholding information from
the USPTO).
105. See 60A AM. JUR. 2D PERJURY § 23 (2016).
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not, as a matter of course, specifically ask whether there is prior
art concerning an invention (let alone any other aspect of patentability); instead, applicants and attorneys are obligated to reveal
prior art and other information material to patentability under
Rule 56. 106 It is worth noting that before the Patent Act of 1952,
however, applicants used to be required to attest that they “do[]
not know and do[] not believe that the same [invention] was ever
before known or used.” 107
The last element, materiality, is tested according to
“whether the false statement was capable of influencing or misleading a tribunal on any proper matter of inquiry . . . . [e]ven if
the false statement failed to influence the tribunal.” 108 In the patent context, this would include anything related to novelty, nonobviousness, utility, inventorship, etc. For example, Woo-suk
submitted an affidavit to the PTAB attesting to the utility of his
stem cell cloning method patent, which led the USPTO to reverse
an earlier decision denying the patent application. 109 Surprisingly, the inequitable conduct doctrine under Therasense applies
a stricter materiality standard than perjury—by requiring butfor causality. The perjury materiality standard is more encompassing because it renders illegal that conduct which could, but
might not, have led the USPTO to grant a patent. Therefore, the
crime of perjury might apply more often than the defense of inequitable misconduct. Given the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt evidentiary burden in criminal cases, though, perjury—along with
all other crimes discussed in this Part—is still harder to prove.
But perhaps not by much; inequitable conduct must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence, a burden of proof between preponderance and beyond a reasonable doubt. 110
B. FALSE STATEMENTS
The crime of making false statements is similar to that of
perjury, but creates culpability for false statements made to an
106. The USPTO may ask for “yes or no” responses to other questions, however, such as whether an applicant for a patent is the original and first inventor
of the invention. See Patterson v. United States, 181 F. 970 (9th Cir. 1910).
107. Compare Patent Act of 1952 § 115, Pl. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (July 19, 1952)
and 35 U.S.C. § 115(b), with Revised Statutes § 4892, 32 Stat. 1226, c. 1019
(U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1454) (quoted) (as reported in Patterson v. United
States, 202 F. 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1913)).
108. United States v. Roberts, 308 F.3d 1147, 1155 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
109. Pollack, supra note 7.
110. See infra Part III.
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agency of the United States, such as the USPTO. 111 Congress
specifically provided that written, willful false statements made
in a patent applications may be prosecuted as false statements
in some situations.112 In addition to the to-an-agency jurisdictional hook, the elements are: (1) knowingly and willfully, (2) falsifying, concealing, or covering up by any trick, scheme, or device
a fact; or making any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or making or using any false writing or document containing any false fictitious or fraudulent statement or
entry, (3) which is material.113
There are at least two criminal cases on record that involve
prosecution for a false statement made in a patent application.
First, in Markham, the defendant made multiple false statements, in an application and affidavits, to the USPTO about the
identity of the original inventors of an invention. 114 The defendant made the statements in an effort to prevent the true inventor
from seeking a similar patent. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction. In the same vein, in Camick, the defendant, in emails to the USPTO and a patent application, represented that his brother was the original inventor. 115 However,
the defendant’s brother died as a child, and the defendant had
assumed the brother’s identity in an effort to evade several obligations. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction for lack of materiality (discussed below). These two cases
demonstrate that a false statement charge for inequitable conduct is not unprecedented. Both cases (in addition to the Patterson perjury case), however, concern only false statements relating to the identity of inventors, not other patentability
requirements or bars.
Just as in cases of perjury, literally true statements, opinions, and beliefs are not actionable false statements. 116 But unlike perjury, omissions can constitute the making of a false statement, so long as the omission involves affirmative

111. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012).
112. See 35 U.S.C. § 25(b). Given the dearth of prosecutions, though, this
congressional suggestion appears to have been largely overlooked.
113. Id. at (a)(1)–(3).
114. See United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1976).
115. See United States v. Camick, 796 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2015).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Hixon, 987 F.2d 1261, 1267 (6th Cir. 1993).

66

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES

[102:49

concealment. 117 This can be shown when there is a duty to disclose material facts.118 In patent cases, USPTO Rule 56 clearly
evinces a duty to disclose information material to patentability.
Thus, a willful failure to disclose prior art, for example, would
constitute a prosecutable false statement. 119
The false statement statute also requires materiality generally, similar to the perjury standard and less than the Therasense standard. Materiality is shown when a statement has “a
natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the
decision of the decision making body to which it was addressed.” 120 In inequitable conduct cases, then, any statement
regarding patentability—as well as, for example, the true identity of the inventor(s)—is material. 121 Both Markham and
Camick confirm this understanding, even though the conviction
in Camick was reversed for lack of materiality. The situation in
Camick was somewhat unique; the defendant had chosen to file
a provisional patent application, 122 which does not require an
oath of inventorship and is not examined, instead of a nonprovisional application (the full application).123 The provisional application was not capable of influencing a USPTO action because
the USPTO does not make any decision with respect to provisional applications.124

117. See United States v. London, 550 F.2d 206, 213–14 (5th Cir. 1977)
(“[T]he mere omission of failing truthfully to disclose a material fact . . . does
not make out an offense under the conceal or cover up clause. . . . Rather, the
. . . clause . . . requires the government to prove . . . that the material fact was
affirmatively concealed . . . .”).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1312 (2d Cir. 1987).
119. One judge has also criticized a knowing failure to correct the USPTO’s
misunderstanding about prior art as “sleazy.” Dorothy Atkins, Attys Who Don’t
Correct Patent Examiners “Sleazy”: Judge, LAW360 (Sept. 28, 2017), https://
www.law360.com/ip/articles/969132/attys-who-don-t-correct-patent-examiners
-sleazy-judge.
120. See United States v. Schulte, 741 F.3d 1141, 1154 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. A false oath of inventorship would always be material under both the
false statement standard and Therasense standard, despite their differences,
because “the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit” is always material under
Therasense. 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
122. See Provisional Application for Patent, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/
patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/provisional
-application-patent (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
123. See United States v. Camick, 796 F.3d 1206, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2015).
124. Id.
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Finally, the intent element (knowingly and willfully) may on
its face impose a limitation on the ability to successfully prosecute a false statement when an applicant omits information. For
example, it may be difficult to prove knowing and willful concealment in the case of willful blindness. If the defendant is not
knowledgeable of prior art, then failure to disclose any prior art
would not be a knowing nondisclosure. But intent might be
shown where the applicant exhibited a reckless disregard for the
truth, combined with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the
truth.125 The inequitable conduct defense captures similar willful blindness. 126 Such an allowance ensures that the willfully ignorant cannot evade the consequences of their deliberate inactions.
C. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
Inequitable conduct may constitute obstruction of justice,
which has a broad reach and is set forth in several statutes. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that the fraudulent procurement of a patent constitutes “tampering with the administration
of justice . . . [that] involves more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and
safeguard the public.” 127 The crime of obstruction of justice is
purposed on addressing harm to broader public interests and institutions, such as the harm risked and caused by inequitable
conduct.
The most applicable statutory variant lies in 18 U.S.C.
§1505, which makes it a crime to (1) corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of
the law, (2) under which any pending proceeding is being had
before any federal agency. 128 The first element is met by conduct
that involves intentionally (and with an improper purpose) altering, destroying, or concealing evidence or making a false or
125. See, e.g., United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64, 70–72 (1st Cir. 2006).
126. See, e.g., Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d
1347, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp.,
267 F.3d 1370, 1380–86 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Synthon IP, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 472 F.
Supp. 2d 760, 779–80 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff ’d in part, 281 F. App’x 995 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (unpublished opinion) (“[T]he duty of candor cannot be avoided by willful
ignorance or compartmentalization of knowledge within a company in an effort
to insulate the patent applicants and their attorneys from information unfavorable to patentability. So, too, patent applicants cannot avoid the duty of candor
by failing to disclose material information to their lawyer or the prosecuting
attorney.”).
127. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2004).
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misleading statement. 129 Similar standards relating to perjury
and false statements apply, but materiality is not required. 130
This makes obstruction of justice easier to prosecute. 131
The second element presents difficulties in the inequitable
conduct context. It requires obstruction of a pending proceeding
conducted by any federal agency, such as the USPTO. “Proceedings” is a broad term which includes agency investigations, adjudications, and essentially any judicial or administrative business before the agency. 132 PTAB reexaminations, appeals,
interferences, and reviews would likely count as proceedings under this definition because they are formal, quasi-judicial processes. But what of examinations, or reconsiderations, where
most inequitable conduct (by definition) occurs? These processes
are not seemingly judicial in nature, but they technically involve
“adjudications” (or decisions) under the Administrative Procedure Act. 133 Thus, any qualifying obstruction relating to the
proper application of patent law to a patent application may be
considered obstruction of justice.
For example, intentionally failing to disclose prior art, or intentionally misleading the USPTO to believe that a claimed invention has actual and realizable utility, would certainly impede
the due and proper administration of the law if a patent is issued
as a result of such concealment—as would intentionally failing
to give credit to the true inventor(s), as in Patterson and Markham. Given that materiality is not required, the barrier in
Camick would not exist in prosecutions for obstruction of justice.
Despite this, there do not appear to be any reported cases prosecuting inequitable conduct as obstruction of justice.
D. MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD
The mail and wire fraud statutes are extremely broad,
granting prosecutors the ability to employ the offense to address
129. See William E. Aiken, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of
18 U.S.C. § 1505 Making it a Federal Offense to Obstruct Proceedings Before
Federal Departments or Agencies or Congressional Committees, 8 A.L.R. Fed.
893, §§ 1–7 (2016).
130. See id.; see also United States v. Price, 951 F.2d 1028, 1030–31 (9th Cir.
1991) (listing the elements of the crime and not including any element of materiality). Note also that the obstruction need not be successful in any way. See
United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277, 1278 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
131. In fact, it is not even necessary that the conduct involved be illegal on
its own. See Aiken, Jr., supra note 129, at § 4.5.
132. See, e.g., Rice vs. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1966).
133. See, e.g., In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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fraud in many of its forms. 134 The Supreme Court has remarked
that both statutes perform a “stopgap” function, enabling the
federal government to address “new phenomenon, until particularized legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly
with the evil.” 135 With this in mind, it would seem apt to turn to
the mail and wire fraud statutes to prosecute inequitable conduct. Yet, there only appears to be one case on record that does:
Camick.
Generally speaking, mail or wire fraud require proof of the
following: (1) the defendant devised or intended to devise a
scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain property by means of materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, (2) with an intent to defraud, and (3) used or caused to be
used the mail or interstate wire communications to carry out the
scheme. 136 The materiality aspect of the first element tracks the
same standard used in both perjury and false statements and is
more lenient than the standard required to commit inequitable
conduct under Therasense. 137 Recall that in Camick the false
statement was the identity of the inventor listed in a provisional
patent application, so the false statement was not material and
could not have a tendency to influence the USPTO. 138
It might appear at first glance that mail or wire fraud is
readily chargeable in cases of inequitable conduct, but the first
element presents an unexpected barrier. Both the mail and wire
fraud statutes require a “scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” 139 The utility of this passage depends on how “defraud” is defined and the effect of the
second “or,” which separates the “scheme to defraud” language
from “obtaining money or property through false statements.”
134. JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE
145 (3d ed. 2009).
135. Id. (citing United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974)).
136. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2012); see also United States v. Camick,
796 F.3d 1206, 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2015).
137. See Camick, 796 F.3d at 1218. Note that the materiality requirement is
not listed in the statute, but that the Supreme Court ruled that Congress intended to include it by codifying the common law. Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 20–25 (1999). Also note that the dissent in Therasense pointed out the
higher standard of materiality required in equitable conduct cases, as opposed
to under the mail and wire fraud statutes. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson
& Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Bryson, Gajarsa, Dyk, & Prost, JJ.,
dissenting).
138. Camick, 796 F.3d at 1218–19.
139. 18 U.S.C §§ 1341, 1343 (emphasis added).
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The interpretation of these two words in the statute has great
limiting effect, as evidenced by the Federal Circuit’s Semiconductor Energy opinion.140
In Semiconductor Energy, the defendant asserted civil RICO
counterclaims in response to the plaintiff’s claim of patent infringement. 141 The RICO suit was based on predicate acts of mail
and wire fraud, in that the plaintiff had defrauded the USPTO
by failing to disclose prior art when the plaintiff applied for three
of the patents-in-suit.142 In evaluating the mail and wire fraud
acts, the Federal Circuit held that inequitable conduct does not
qualify as an act of mail or wire fraud because the statutes narrowly define fraud as depriving another person of property. 143
The Federal Circuit then stated that although a patent is property, the USPTO itself was not deprived of the patent-in-suit because the USPTO did not have property rights in the patent before it granted the patent. 144
In making these determinations, the Federal Circuit relied
primarily on the Supreme Court’s McNally decision, which limited both the mail and wire fraud statutes’ breadth to exclude
intangible property rights, such as the right to honest services,
on legislative intent grounds. 145 The dissent in McNally argued,
however, that the majority was ignoring Congress’s use of the
word “or” between the “scheme to defraud” and “property rights”
language.146 In the dissenters’ view, “[a]s the language makes
clear . . . one could violate the first clause by devising a scheme
or artifice to defraud, even though one did not violate the second
clause by seeking to obtain money or property.” 147
Several circuit courts agreed. For example, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed a mail fraud conviction for the fraudulent acquisition of a medical license, stating “[t]he statute . . .

140. See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 204 F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
141. Id. at 1372.
142. Id. at 1379.
143. Id. at 1380.
144. See id.
145. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (1988), as recognized in Skilling v. United States, 561
U.S. 358 (2010).
146. Id. at 364–65 (Stevens & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting).
147. Id. at 365 (“I am at a loss to understand the source or justification for
this holding. Certainly no canon of statutory construction requires us to ignore
the plain language of the provision.”).
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is broad enough to cover a scheme to defraud a victim of something that takes on value only in the hands of the acquirer.” 148
Relying on McNally, though, the Supreme Court in Cleveland
reversed the Third and other Circuits, stating that property acquired through fraud must first be property in the regulator’s
hands. 149 The Supreme Court repeated its ultimatum from
McNally that “if Congress desires to go further, it must speak
more clearly than it has.” 150 This holding did not rely on an interpretation of the statute’s disjunctive language. Ten years after Semiconductor Energy, the Supreme Court recognized in
Skilling that Congress overruled McNally. 151 However, Skilling
only narrowly expanded property rights to include deprivation of
honest services resulting from bribes and kickbacks, in line with
Cleveland.152
In light of the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the
mail and wire fraud statutes, it is unlikely that inequitable conduct falls within their ambit. However, it is worth noting that
some courts have taken notice of the disjunctive “or” and defined
schemes to defraud as including departures from standards of
fair play and candid dealings.153 Such schemes would include
concealment of facts through intentional omissions or failures to
disclose in violation of either a legal or ethical duty. 154 Thus, the
first element would be met even in cases where an applicant intentionally fails to disclose prior art under USPTO Rule 56.
The other two elements would likely be met in most cases of
inequitable conduct. Intent can be shown by the circumstances,155 and all interactions with the USPTO—with the exception of in-person hearings in front of the PTAB—are conducted via mail or interstate wires.156 Absent congressional
148. United States v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 709, 713 (3d Cir. 1990), abrogated
by Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000).
149. See Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 20.
150. Id.
151. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–10 (2010).
152. Id. at 409.
153. See Marissa Pezo, Mail and Wire Fraud, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 745, 749
(2007).
154. See id. at 752 & n.54 (citing United States v. Richman, 944 F.2d 323,
333 (7th Cir. 1991)).
155. See Pezo, supra note 153, at 752.
156. The use of the mail or wires would also be in furtherance of the
scheme—or at the very least incidental to an essential part of it—as a direct
misrepresentation or omission affecting the issuance of a patent. See id. at 756–
57.
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expansion of the mail and wire fraud statutes, however, fraudulent procurement of a patent is not a violation under the Cleveland and Semiconductor Energy precedents despite prior circuit
enthusiasm to hold otherwise. This is one specific area in which
the mail and wire fraud statutes are not quite as broad as popularly believed. 157
III. WHETHER PROSECUTING INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
IS WARRANTED
Cases such as Patterson, Markham, and Camick demonstrate that prosecuting inequitable conduct is possible under the
perjury and false statement statutes, and it is very likely that
obstruction of justice is also viable. But such prosecutions are
rare. This Part asks whether, even if prosecution is possible, the
federal government should bring charges in certain circumstances.
A. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are two main schools of thought with respect to criminal punishment: utilitarianism and retributivism. 158 Utilitarianism aims primarily to deter and prevent crimes and considers
the myriad of factors that motivate human behavior. 159 On the
retributivism side, punishment is seen as correcting an imbalance of justice or blameworthiness perceived by a collective conscience.160 This view takes into account the costs and harms imposed by certain conduct and the unfair power disadvantage that
perpetrators have over their victims. 161 It seeks to right wrongs
against others, sometimes no matter the externalities.

157. There are several good reasons to think that the mail and wire fraud
statutes should encompass inequitable conduct. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 204 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (No. 00-138), 2000 WL 33999400.
158. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 731, 757–58 (2007). A third, newer school of
thought, “over-criminalization,” challenges, among other things, the use of criminal law to regulate conduct that traditionally only engendered civil consequences. See, e.g., Michael P. Kelly & Ruth E. Mandelbaum, Are the Yates Memorandum and the Federal Judiciary’s Concerns About Over-Criminaliziation
Destined to Collide?, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899 (2016); Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537 (2012).
159. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural
Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH. L. REV. 205, 208–16 (2003).
160. See id. at 216–24.
161. See id.
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Both utilitarianism and retributivism support criminal
prosecution of inequitable conduct in cases where such conduct
can be shown beyond-a-reasonable-doubt and would not raise
the concerns that informed Therasense’s heightened standards.
Starting with retributivism, punishing those who intentionally
procure patents via inequitable conduct and later abuse the patent monopoly comports with the goals of correcting wrongs: not
only those committed in fraudulently procuring a patent, but
also in fraudulently litigating it. This is especially the case when
there is a large power differential between a patent holder and
an accused infringer—a not uncommon occurrence.162 Thus,
there is a need for the government to actively protect downstream victims of inequitable conduct (especially small ones), as
well as to send a clear message that inequitable conduct is illegal. 163 In addition, inequitable conduct “is a wrong against the
institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot be complacently tolerated.” 164 Prosecuting inequitable conduct would not only vindicate private
wrongs, but also public wrongs as well.
As to utilitarianism, just like criminal fraud generally, inequitable conduct (and conduct incidental to it) involves deceit,
which society generally has an interest in deterring and preventing. Society also has a utilitarian interest in deterring and preventing patent fraud in particular, due to its resulting effects.
Not only does the assertion of fraudulently-procured patents
against businesses and consumers impose unwarranted and
enormous costs on the American economy, but also actually proving inequitable conduct in a court of law may require upwards of
$10 million in attorneys’ fees, depending on the circumstances.165 Moreover, the power of a patent’s monopoly grant, especially when wielded in a way that leads to increased costs to
the public and possible anticompetitive effects, is substantial. 166
Prosecution may serve as a way of deterring inequitable conduct
162. See Chien, supra note 38, at 1592.
163. See Retributive Justice, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(June 18, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-retributive/#Pun.
164. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944).
165. See TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1309
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming an award of over $10 million in attorneys’ fees for
defending against a sham infringement suit and bringing an antitrust action);
TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 16 F. Supp. 3d 385, 398 (D. N.J.
2014).
166. See, e.g., Kyle R. Kroll, Anticompetitive Until Proven Innocent: An Antitrust Proposal to Embargo Covert Patent Privateering, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2167,
2189–95 (2016).
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and preventing its attendant harms and, therefore, would be justified under utilitarianism.
Most judges and scholars tend to evaluate white-collar punishment from the lens of utilitarianism and focus especially on
deterrence. 167 Because most white-collar criminals typically
have short or non-existent criminal records (or are not even persons, such as when corporations themselves are defendants), the
goal is to punish with an eye toward what will most likely influence defendants’ future behavior, other similarly-situated professionals, and the industry’s culture.168 With this in mind, there
is an instinctual tendency to punish crimes harshly as a warning
that the law will come down hard. However, research suggests
that the certainty of punishment deters much more than the severity of punishment.169 This is especially the case for low-risk
(of violent harm) offenders such as white-collar criminals. 170
Thus, courts are faced with the difficult task of both conveying
the message that punishment for certain conduct is very likely,
while at the same time imposing adequate—but not too lenient—
punishments to deter would-be offenders from committing the
crimes sought to be deterred.171 This invariably requires taking
into account the possible rewards derived from the criminal conduct, as well as the risk of social stigma and peers’ moral condemnation.172

167. See Kenneth Mann et al., Sentencing the White-Collar Offender, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 479, 482–83 (1980), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=5129&context=fss_papers.
168. See id. at 483.
169. See, e.g., Valerie Wright, Deterence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 3 (2010), http://
www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Deterrence-in
-Criminal-Justice.pdf.
170. See id. at 7; see also Five Things About Deterrence, NAT. INST. OF JUSTICE, https://www.nij.gov/five-things/Pages/deterrence.aspx (last visited Mar. 5,
2018) (“Sending an individual convicted of a crime to prison isn’t a very effective
way to deter crime.”).
171. See Katie A. Fredericks et al., White Collar Crime: Recidivism, Deterrence, and Social Impact, 2 FORENSIC RES. & CRIMINOLOGY INT’L J. 39, 39
(2016), http://medcraveonline.com/FRCIJ/FRCIJ-02-00039.pdf.
172. See RAY PATERNOSTER & STEPHEN G. TIBBETTS, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND PERCEPTUAL DETERRENCE (2016), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199925513.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199925513-e-30; J. Scott Dutcher,
Comment, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock: The Justifications for Harsher
Punishment of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1295, 1319
(2006).
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In the patent fraud context, courts also have to consider how
to deter both individuals and organizations because either can
commit inequitable conduct. All the crimes discussed in this article provide for, in addition to individual liability, corporate liability for the acts of agents under theories of respondeat superior. 173 Inventors within a corporation, as well as the corporation
itself, can be prosecuted for inequitable conduct.174 For this reason, employers should have programs and policies to ensure that
their employee-applicants comply with Rule 56.
Principal liability statutes also capture any persons who
“counsel” the commission of an offense, such as attorneys. 175 In
addition to bringing a charge against an inventor and/or a corporate-employer, a charge against an attorney is possible. 176 Because attorneys are in a position to prevent inequitable conduct
by advising clients on patentability requirements, bars, and the
duty of candor, 177 the possibility of prosecution for assisting
fraud may serve as an additional deterrent overall. 178 But
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 24 (2012) (for antitrust violations).
174. Successful prosecution against a corporation may be possible because
patents are for the benefit of the employer; the corporate-employer almost always holds all patent rights as “assignee.” See Ownership/Assignability of Patents and Applications, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/
s301.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). In addition, being listed as the assignee
requires a record of assignment in the application. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.46 (2012).
This could exhibit the principal’s approval of the inventor-employee’s conduct.
Though, whether specific instances of nondisclosure or misrepresentation were
approved of by the employer would remain a question of fact.
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a); see also United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313 (2d
Cir. 1994); United States v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1986) (involving
§ 1001). In most cases, attorneys assist inventors (whether persons or corporations) in applying for a patent.
176. This implicates issues relating to confidentiality and attorney-client
privilege. For example, would an attorney be allowed to share information about
any fraud in applying for the patent because the ethics rules might allow for
disclosure? See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2012). Would the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege apply? See
Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding
that the exception applies to fraud on the patent office). Attorneys operating in
the intellectual property space face a host of challenging ethical issues that may
implicate inequitable conduct. See generally Leonard Raykinsteen, Ethical Considerations in Intellectual Property Law, 99 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
47, 59 (2017).
177. See Patent Litigation Practice Note, supra note 40 (stating that patent
trolls, for example, often regularly use the same counsel).
178. But see Van Asdale v. Int’l Game, Tech., 498 F.Supp.2d 1321 (D. Nev.
2007), rev’d and vacated, 577 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that attorneys
did not receive whistleblower protection for disclosing fraud on the USPTO under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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whether the possible punishments under the most applicable
statutes would be great enough to deter inequitable conduct by
offsetting its advantages and rewards depends on the facts, circumstances, and motivations behind each patent.
A conviction for inequitable conduct via perjury, false statement, or obstruction of justice could entail fines and/or prison
sentences of up to five years.179 These consequences—as opposed, or in addition, to professional discipline or the invalidation of a patent—might be enough to deter unscrupulous applicants from defrauding the USPTO, offsetting the ill-gotten gains
to be realized through litigating the patents and obtaining settlement awards. When it comes to corporations and other entities, however, small fines might not deter.180 Liability of corporate officers and suspension from asserting patent infringement
or even applying for new patents would likely be sufficient. This
punishment was handed down in a civil case brought by the Department of Justice for inequitable conduct in Union Camp. 181
Combined with the professional and business stigma that would
likely result from being branded a patent fraudster, these punishments could offset the potential benefits derived from inequitable conduct. Criminal punishment would likely have a
stronger effect than usual in deterring behavior here because patent applicants are typically knowledgeable about the state of
the law and can easily understand the consequences of violating
it—two important factors to effective deterrence.182
That inequitable conduct continues to occur suggests that
current consequences, like that of the defense of inequitable con-

179. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1001(a), 1505 (2012).
180. Some litigants can fetch average settlements of around $300,000. See
Patent Assertion Entity Activity, FTC, 3, 10, 43 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc-study/
p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf; Mario H. Lopez,
Patent Trolls Profit at Your Expense, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 11, 2014), http://
www.washingtonexaminer.com/patent-trolls-profit-at-your-expense/article/
2541977; Ira Blumberg, Why Patent Trolls Won’t Give Up, TECH CRUNCH (June
5, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/05/why-patent-trolls-wont-give-up.
181. See United States v. Union Camp Corp., No. 5005-A, 1969 WL 192827
(E.D. Va. 1969).
182. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A
Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 173, 173, 175
(2004).
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duct and professional discipline, fail to fully deter fraud from occurring. 183 Indeed, one commentator has reasoned that the inequitable conduct defense and punishment of invalidation create
“upside-down incentives to engage in dishonest conduct,” resulting in little to no deterrence at all. 184 Some might argue that inequitable conduct is not so widespread as to justify deterrence
using the criminal law. 185 But given application trends, the opportunities to procure patents through fraud, the USPTO’s lack
of resources, the difficulty in investigating and stopping inequitable conduct during the application process, the harmful effects
that can result from inequitable conduct down the line, that
many patent cases never proceed past early stages and are settled due to the high cost to defend, and that courts continue to
find inequitable conduct, the problem is at least serious enough
to warrant such consequences in the worst cases. Even if inequitable conduct is not widespread, prosecuting the most egregious
cases of inequitable conduct is worthwhile and desirable because
doing so fulfills the goals of criminal punishment and would
work to deter more egregious cases in the future. Focusing on
the worst cases would also comport with Therasense.
B. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In order to realize the benefits of prosecution, the Department of Justice would need to actually charge applicants for committing inequitable conduct. Traditionally, the Department considers three factors when charging: (1) whether there is a
substantial federal interest, (2) whether the proposed defendant
is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, and (3)
whether there is an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. 186 Due to the increased interest in and scrutiny of patents, the overwhelming public interests at stake, 187 and the significant interests in maintaining the health of a system that is
183. E.g., Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2017).
184. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Upside-Down Inequitable Conduct Defense, 107
NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2013); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139
F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[I]t seems most improbable that an inventor
would choose to forfeit the benefits of patent protection because of fear of the
risk of being found tortiously liable based upon attempting to enforce a patent
obtained by inequitable conduct.”).
185. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major
patent case has become an absolute plague.”).
186. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.220 (2015).
187. See,e.g., Leslie, supra note 41, at 325.
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responsible for the United States’ continued technological might,
inequitable conduct is a matter of substantial federal interest. 188
Indeed, one of the Department’s top priorities is fighting fraud
in the business world and related misconduct. 189
Applicants who commit inequitable conduct are not subject
to effective prosecution in other jurisdictions. Most states have
recently enacted statutes criminalizing the assertion of patent
infringement in bad faith. 190 These state criminal statutes target
activities that sometimes are derivative of and incidental to
fraud during the application process. But these laws do not address the root cause (for some cases) of bad faith litigation:
namely, that a patent is granted when it should not have been
and through fraud. This result is exacerbated by the statutory
presumption that a patent is valid, 191 which can deter rivals
from competing in an industry and enable fraudulent patent
holders to extort large settlements and achieve anticompetitive
ends. 192
In addition, current non-criminal alternatives do not appear
sufficient to deter inequitable conduct. Despite the existence of
the defense of inequitable conduct, affirmative defenses of patent
invalidity, and professional discipline,193 inequitable conduct
persists and may even be increasing in frequency. 194 Therefore,
there may be reason to believe that non-criminal alternatives are
inadequate, which may also justify finding a substantial federal
interest in deterring inequitable conduct.195 This would come
188. This might be especially the case in certain districts where patent litigation consumes the docket. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An Empirical Study of Infringement Litigation 1985–2010,
11 JOHN MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 28 (2011). Note, however, that the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group
Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017), may change which districts the effects of
patent fraud will be felt the most in the future.
189. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL:
INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CORPORATE WRONGDOING (2015), https://
www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [hereinafter Yates Memo].
190. See Hyde, supra note 22.
191. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
192. See, e.g., Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, ANTITRUST, Summer 2013, at 10.
193. See 35 U.S.C. § 32; e.g., Jaskiewisz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d 1053 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
194. This is shown by the fact that the patentee win percentage in inequitable conduct cases has been trending down for the past 30 years. See Lee Petherbridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1310 (2010).
195. Cf. Candor, Disclsoure & OED, USPTO, 3 (2016), https://www.uspto
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into play most when the inequitable conduct is highly deceptive
and brazen.
Ultimately, though, bringing a charge is always a matter of
discretion. The fact that the Department of Justice has already
prosecuted fraud on the USPTO in Patterson and Markham and
brought charges in Camick shows that at least some U.S. Attorneys believe bringing false statement charges is warranted in
appropriate cases. But whether the Department of Justice would
charge a corporation in addition to its employees would depend
on many factors, such as the pervasiveness of the conduct. 196
Where appropriate, charging a corporation may assist in securing its cooperation in investigating a pattern or practice of inequitable conduct.197
Even if U.S. Attorneys do decide to prosecute inequitable
conduct, there may be a concern that proving a violation of any
of the criminal statutes discussed herein would be too difficult.
In many cases, there is not enough evidence to prove inequitable
conduct even under the clear and convincing evidence standard,
and courts often reject assertions of inequitable conduct. 198 Proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt may be very difficult because the circumstantial evidence in many cases of inequitable
conduct, even though proven by clear and convincing evidence,
may only show that an applicant did not do something. Circumstantial evidence showing willful or knowing behavior is not im-

.gov/sites/default/files/documents/AIPLA_2016_Slides.pdf (showing that only
twenty-two persons registered to practice before the USPTO were disciplined in
2016).
196. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 186, at § 9-28.300; see also id. at
§ 9-28.1000 (noting that whether a corporation has taken meaningful remedial
measures, implemented meaningful corporate compliance programs, established awareness among employees that criminal conduct will not be tolerated,
and exhibits “the highest standards of legal and ethical behavior ” are factors to
consider when determining whether or not to prosecute a corporation).
197. For example, the Yates Memo outlines how cooperation can serve as a
mitigating factor. See Yates Memo, supra note 189.
198. See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1196–97 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (Newman, J., dissenting) (referring to the assertion of inequitable conduct
as often “specious” and widespread assertion as a “plague”); Petherbridge et al.,
supra note 194, at 1315–16. But see Ryan Davis, Inequitable Conduct a Dying
Defense 2 Years Post-Therasense, LAW360 (May 23, 2013), https://www.law360
.com/articles/444480/inequitable-conduct-a-dying-defense-2-years-post
-therasense (reporting that practitioners have seen a marked decline in the assertion of inequitable conduct after Therasense).
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possible to come by, however. And systematic inequitable conduct might be enough to prove a deliberate scheme or practice to
defraud the USPTO in some cases. 199
One recent inequitable conduct ruling illustrates that sufficient evidence of inequitable conduct may exist in some cases. In
TransWeb v. 3M, the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of inequitable conduct when 3M declared to the USPTO that 3M received samples of its applied-for invention after signing a confidentiality agreement. 200 Based on this, 3M claimed the samples
were not prior art. But in fact, 3M received the samples at an
industry expo. The district court, after reviewing the extensive
evidence in the case, concluded that “in-house attorney[s] at 3M
. . . acted with specific intent to deceive the patent office as to the
[samples].” 201 The evidence supporting this conclusion included
expo documents, emails, letters, testimony, meeting notes, and
the actual samples.202 3M was also found liable for a Walker Process violation. 203
Although TransWeb may be abnormal in its wealth of evidence, similar cases also exist. 204 The Department of Justice
would be aided by discovery in civil cases and could pick and
choose the most prosecutable cases of inequitable conduct based
on civil rulings. A finding of inequitable conduct in a civil case
could also constitute admissible evidence of a prior bad act. 205
Although concerns over the burden of proof are valid, they do not
completely undercut the worthy goal of deterring inequitable
conduct in the patent system.
199. See Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. HTC Corp., 732 F.3d 1339, 1344–45 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
200. See TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1304–
05 (Fed. Cir. 2016); TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 16 F. Supp. 3d
385, 398 (D. N.J. 2014).
201. Transweb, 812 F.3d at 1304.
202. See id. at 1305–06.
203. See id. at 1309–10 (“3M’s unlawful act was the bringing of suit based
on a patent known to be fraudulently obtained.”). The author makes no judgment as to whether 3M committed inequitable conduct and merely cites
Transweb as a recent ruling applicable to the subject of this Essay.
204. See,e.g., Intellect Wireless, 732 F.4d at 1344–45; Regeneron Pharma.,
Inc. v. Mercus B.V., 144 F.Supp.3d 530, 582–85, 595–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Worldwide Home Prods., Inc. v. Bed, Bath and Beyond, Inc., 74 F.Supp.3d 626, 636–
38 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
205. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung
Elec. Co., 4 F.Supp.2d 477, 487 (E.D. Vir. 1998). But see McNeil-PPC, Inc. v.
Perrigo Co., 516 F.Supp.2d 238, 258 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Procter & Gamble Co.
v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 697 F.Supp. 1360, 1366–67 (D. Del. 1988).
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C. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
As noted above in Part II, the statutory schemes for the most
applicable federal crimes can present non-intuitive obstacles to
prosecuting inequitable conduct. If there is legislative support,
some minor statutory modifications would alleviate those obstacles. One such change would be to revive the statutory requirement that an applicant’s oath (made upon submitting the application and currently only relating to inventorship) include not
only an affirmative declaration that there is no prior art, but also
that the applicant has actual knowledge of the invention’s utility
and level of required ingenuity and skill to make. 206 Making this
change would require applicants to make more affirmative statements. The change would impose additional duties on applicants, but those additional duties could assist the USPTO in its
examination process.
Another change would be to fix the disjunctive language in
the mail and wire fraud statutes to allow prosecution merely for
schemes to defraud. In the alternative, the language could be
changed to enable prosecution for the obtaining of property that
does not exist until issued by a government office and in the
hands of the applicant (e.g., a medical license or a patent). Such
a change would override Semiconductor Energy and Cleveland’s
current obstacle for prosecuting inequitable conduct under the
mail and wire fraud statutes.207 Fixing the disjunctive language
or better defining property for mail and wire fraud would clarify
the statutes and open the door to prosecuting patterned and
large-scale schemes to defraud the USPTO.
The above reforms would increase the possibility of prosecuting inequitable conduct. By increasing this possibility, deterrence would be heightened. The reforms would also enable courts
to impose broader penalties, when needed, to effectuate the
proper balance between the risks and rewards of committing inequitable conduct as part of a scheme. Finally, reforms could also
provide better notice to applicants that certain conduct is criminal, reducing Rule of Lenity concerns. 208 For example, a broader

206. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 134–60 and accompanying text.
208. To this end, the possibility that the Rule of Lenity, see 73 AM. JUR. 2D
Statutes § 188 (2018), might be applied to a prosecution for inequitable conduct
would be reduced, even though the possibility is low already. To wit, lenity was
not brought up in Patterson, Markham, or Camick.
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applicant oath would put applicants on greater notice that material omissions could be prosecuted as perjury, false statements,
or obstruction of justice. 209
CONCLUSION
Inequitable conduct is the act of intentionally making a materially false statement or omission to the USPTO when applying for a patent. This form of fraud is brought on by competitive
or deceptive interests, enabled by imperfections in the U.S. patent system, and motivated by the ever-increasing value of patents. Once the fraud is successful and a patent is granted, unscrupulous applicants often turn into unscrupulous litigants and
use their patents to extort settlements through threats and litigation. Overall, inequitable conduct imposes costs on consumers,
competition, and the economy.
At least three criminal prosecutions have been brought
against applicants for committing inequitable conduct. Two
modern cases were for the crime of false statements, but inequitable conduct may also constitute the crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice against an agency. Mail and wire fraud are
not applicable under current precedent. Although successful
criminal prosecution of inequitable conduct is possible under the
federal perjury, false statements, and obstruction of justice statutes, it is up to the Department of Justice to pursue such charges
when appropriate, in view of the goals of punishment and prosecutorial guidelines. Given the federal interests at stake, prosecution is desirable in egregious cases. And the deterrent effect of
such prosecutions would likely promote greater applicant accountability and patent integrity.

209. See Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System,
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1217, 1284 n.145 (2017) (“[The inventor] statement under
penalty of criminal sanctions evinces a clear intent to dissuade inventors from
knowingly filing for undeserved rights.”).

